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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Plaintiff/Appellant Ken Claypoole filed his Notice of Appeal on April 30, 2009. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by (a) not allowing a written jury 
questionnaire, (b) failing to ask prospective jurors appropriate preliminary questions designed 
to detect whether any of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda, 
(c) failing to allow the Plaintiff the intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges? 
The issues were preserved for appeal at R. Partial Transcript of Pretrial 
Conference September 16, 2008, 3:10, 4:3, R. 1308, R. 1381, R. 1383 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it allowed Plaintiffs 
settlement demand letter, from a previous civil case, into evidence? 
The issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1621, 80:11, R. 1622, 315:1, 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by submitting a confusing special 
jury verdict form to the jury? 
The issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1623, 517:14, 522:23 - 523:11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Regarding Issue No. 1, the Utah Court of Appeal has stated, 
"We review challenges to the trial court's management of jury voir dire under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Generally, the trial court is afforded broad 
discretion in conducting voir dire, "but that discretion must be exercised in 
favor of allowing discovery of biases or prejudice in prospective jurors." 
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Barrett v. Petersen, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
Hall 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. Denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1990)) (other citations omitted). 
Due to the strong interest in enabling parties "to elicit necessary information 
for ferreting out bias, " State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 34, 992 P.2d 951, a 
trial court's discretion is most broad when it is exercised with respect to 
questions that have no apparent link to any potential bias. However, the trial 
judge's discretion narrows to the extent that questions do have some possible 
link, to possible bias, and when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the 
existence of an actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must 
allow such inquiries. Id. at \ 43. 
Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p.3d 601, at fflj 10, 11. 
2. Regarding Issue No. 2, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
We review the trial court's determinations regarding the admissibility 
of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Anderson v. Thompson, 176 P.3d 464, 2008 UT App 3 (Utah App., 2008) at 1J25. 
3. Regarding issue No. 3, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
f,[t]he use of special verdicts or interrogatories is a matter for the trial 
court's sound discretion." CambeltInt'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 
1241 (Utah 1987);.. .A trial court may use a special verdict form as long 
as the form does not "mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[] the jury on 
the law." Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (citation and quotations omitted). 
Vaughn v. Anderson, 2005 UT App 423 (UT 10/6/2005), 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this personal injury action, the trial court rejected plaintiff s requested use of a jury 
questionnaire and also rejected most of plaintiff s requested voir dire questions designed to 
reveal prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports about personal injury cases and their 
prejudices against such cases. During the trial, the court allowed defendants to introduce 
most of a settlement demand letter that was used in an unrelated case in which plaintiffs 
counsel made certain statements regarding plaintiff s physical condition. The court submitted 
a special jury verdict questionnaire which was confusing to the jury. The jury returned a 
verdict of no cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ken Claypoole was involved in two motor vehicle collision within 
approximately five minutes of each other. Mr. Claypoole was hit by a pickup truck owned 
by Boyd Ross and driven by his minor step son Neil Skougard. Boyd Ross is Neil 
Skougard9 s step-father. Mr. Claypoole, while parked on the side of the road, was hit again 
from behind by a truck owned by Winward Electric Service, Inc., and driven by Michael 
Wood, Winward's employee. R. 1, R. 4. 
2. Mr. Claypoole sued defendants Neil G, Skougard and Boyd Ross and settled 
with them prior to trial for $25,000 and $2,000 respectively. 
3. Mr. Claypoole also sued defendants Winward Electric Service, Inc., and its 
driver, Michael Wood. R. 1, R. 4. 
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4. This trial was scheduled to start on November 105 2008. R. 267. 
5. On September 16,2008, following oral arguments on 11 motions in limine and 
a pre-trial, plaintiff informed the court that he was going to submit a jury questionnaire to the 
court for submission to the jury panel. R. Partial Transcript of Pretrial Conference September 
16,2008,3:10,4:3. 
6. The court on September 16, 2008 indicated to counsel that he was not going 
to submit a jury questionnaire to the jury panel. R. Partial Transcript of Pretrial Conference 
September 16, 2008, 4:6, 4:11, 4:16. 
7. On or about September 25, 2008, (filed October 2, 2008), plaintiff submitted 
his motion and supporting memorandum requesting a jury questionnaire be submitted to the 
jury as part of the jury voir dire. R. 1308. 
8. The November, 2008 trial setting was continued until March 9,2009. R. 1324. 
9. On February 23, 2009, during a telephone conference with the court and 
defense counsel, the plaintiff again requested that a jury voir dire questionnaire be submitted 
to the jury panel. Plaintiff was told by the court that no jury voir dire questionnaire would be 
allowed. Plaintiff was also told by the court that no jury voir dire by counsel would be 
allowed, but, follow up questions would be permitted. The telephone conference was not 
recorded, consequently there is no record of this conversation. 
10. On February 27,2009, (filed March 16,2009), Plaintiff submitted to the court 
his requested jury voir dire. R. 1383. 
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11. On the 2nd day of March, 2009, (filed March 16,2009), Plaintiff submitted his 
requested jury instructions and special verdict form. R. 1381. Addendum 2. 
12. Trial was held starting March 9, 2009. R. 1370. 
13. During voir dire the court asked the question "The next thing I'd like to ask 
you, do any of you hold the opinion that in this country today there's a lawsuit crisis caused 
by excessive jury verdicts? Do any of you hold that kind of an attitude? Ms. Sorensen?" R. 
1621,32:19. 
14. Ms. Sorensen, one of the members of the jury venire, indicated that she had an 
attitude that there is a lawsuit crisis caused by excessive jury verdicts and that she thinks 
"there's too much...'5 R. 1621 33:1 The trial court then iilterrupted Ms Sorensen and 
proceeded to rehabilitate her in open court: 
THE COURT: "Well, let me phrase it in this sense, I'm certain we're all 
concerned about things that we have that we observe in our society. The 
question becomes as you sit here as a juror in regards to the plaintiff here, Mr. 
Claypoole and these other individuals as defendant, what we are looking for 
is a juror that would be able to look at the facts as they're presented during the 
course of the trial and render a fair judgment without prejudgement or 
pre-predilection to go in a certain direction or do a certain thing. For instance, 
are you feelings such that you could not award to Mr. Claypoole a judgment 
of damages if you felt it was supported by the evidence? Would you be able 
to do that? R. 1621,33:2. 
Ms. Sorensen replied: "I would be able to." R. 1621, 33:15. 
The court then continued with his rehabilitation questions: 
THE COURT: You wouldn't have any trouble doing that if you felt the 
evidence... 
MS. SORENSEN: No trouble if... 
THE COURT: supported that? 
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MS. SORENSEN: if I felt the evidence... 
THE COURT: We're primarily talking about those kinds of lawsuits basically 
where it would be found that there was no justification. Is that what you're 
thinking about? 
MS. SORENSEN: Right. R. 1621, 33:16 - 25. 
15. The trial court asked a few other questions, purportedly to discover potential 
juror bias in regard to cases such as this and in regard to attitude towards attorneys. In so 
doing he phrased his question as follows: 
THE COURT: "This next question, I ask each of you, do any of you have any 
such negative feelings about attorneys that you couldn't act fairly in this case? 
But the point is again as I've indicated, is that you're going to be asked to judge 
this case on what you see here in court and not be prejudiced or bias because 
of any feelings that you have generally about counsel. Do any of you have 
kinds of feelings that would prevent you from being fair and just in this case? 
Response is negative.55 R. 1621, 34:12 
16. The court allowed plaintiff to ask some follow up questions, after the court, at 
plaintiffs request, explained to the panel the different burden of proof in a civil case from 
a criminal case. Plaintiff started to ask questions to ferret out any prejudice or bias in the jury 
venire's members5 minds and to question the jury venire about the ability to make any award 
based upon harms and losses suffered by plaintiff. The court interrupted counsel when he 
was asking the question regarding harms and losses. The exchange went as follows: 
MR. HAVAS: Yes, Your Honor, just following up on that, on 
the preponderance, some people think preponderance essentially 
is we, the plaintiff, Mr. Claypoole, has just a little bit of a 
burden to show that the burden that we're going to show you, 
that we're a little bit more right than wrong. Some people 
disagree with that, think that's unfair to the defense that we 
only have to show a little bit more right than wrong. Is there 
anyone of you that is in a camp where the people feel that that 
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is not fair? Or on the other hand, is there anyone that feels that 
that is fair burden for us to only have to prove a little bit more 
right than wrong? Thank you. 
Another question that I would like to have answered is to make 
sure that the harms or the losses that we're going to be asking 
you about, can only be compensated by award of money. That's 
the way our system is and that the money must solely be decided 
on the basis of the harms and losses that we're claiming that the 
defense caused. Is there anyone here that feels that that is 
unfair or is there anyone here that is all right that? Is there 
anyone here that feels that that is okay to... 
THE COURT: Let's ask it another way. Ladies and gentlemen, 
are there any of you that feel that it would be unfair to award a 
money judgment as far as payment for damage in a case such as 
this? Thank you. R. 1621, 38:5 - 39:4. 
17. Plaintiff used one of his peremptory challenges to excuse Ms. Sorensen from 
the jury. R. 1422.. 
18. On March 16,2009, the case was given to the jury after having been instructed 
by the court. Prior to being instructed by the court, the parties met in chambers with the court 
and reviewed the jury instructions and the special verdict form. R. 1623 493:8 - 523:11. 
19. Plaintiff took exception to the introductory paragraph of the special verdict 
form proposed by the court as being confusing regarding the wording "preponderates." R. 
1621 517:14. The court rejected plaintiff sconcem.R. 1621 517:21 and left the introductory 
paragraph stand as it was drafted by the court. R. 522:23 - 523:11. 
20. The jury returned a verdict of no cause. In doing so the jury only answered 
question 1 on the special verdict form. R. 1417. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A parties' Seventh Amendment (U.S. Const, am. 7) and Utah Const, art. I, § 10fs, right 
to a trial by jury, is meaningless, unless the litigants have a right to actively participate in 
selecting an unbiased jury. In order to be able to select an unbiased jury, the trial court should 
allow voir dire questions to cover areas of concern to the parties, preferably by having 
attorney conducted voir dire. If the trial court will not allow attorney conducted voir dire, it 
should allow a written jury questionnaire to be submitted to the jury as part of the voir dire 
process. Failure by the court in this case, to allow attorney conducted voir dire, or to allow 
a written jury questionnaire to be submitted to the jury venire, and instead conducting the jury 
voir dire himself, not accepting plaintiffs requested voir dire questions, caused the jury to 
become sensitized to follow up questions posed by plaintiff and no meaningful information 
was gleaned from the voir dire process. Consequently plaintiff was unable to intelligently 
exercise his peremptory challenges. 
During the trial the court allowed defendants, over the objection of plaintiff, to 
introduce and refer to a settlement demand letter which plaintiffs attorney had sent to an 
insurance adjuster in a different case. The letter was consequently used by defendants to 
impeach plaintiffs witnesses. Defendants also made much of the letter and its context in 
their closing argument. The trial court erred in allowing defendants to use the letter in 
violation of Rule 408, Utah Rules of Evidence as is discussed in Anderson v. Thompson, 176 
8 
P.3d 464,2008 UT App 3 (Utah App. 2008). The evidence of the letter and its context should 
have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Plaintiff had requested a special verdict form to be submitted to the jury in its 
deliberations. R. 1381 and had submitted a proposed special verdict form along with his 
proposed jury instructions. The court submitted a special verdict form to the jury, R. 1417, 
however, the special verdict form submitted was one of the court's making and was unduly 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY (A) NOT 
ALLOWING A WRITTEN JURY QUESTIONNAIRE, (B) FAILING TO 
ASK PROSPECTIVE JURORS APPROPRIATE PRELIMINARY 
QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO DETECT WHETHER ANY OF THE 
PROSPECTIVE JURORS HAD BEEN EXPOSED TO TORT REFORM 
PROPAGANDA, (C) FAILING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF THE 
INTELLIGENT EXERCISE OF HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. 
Plaintiff had requested that he be allowed to voir dire the jury venire directly in order 
to communicate with the jury and thus get a good feel for the biases, prejudices and attitudes 
held by the individual members of the venire. See Jackson Howard, Lawyer-Conducted Voir 
Dire is a Seventh Amendment Right, Voir Dire, Summer, 1995, 
http://www.utahbar.org/sites/litigation/Howard_2.pdfand for a discussion on how attorney 
conducted voir dire worked in practice, see Robert B. Sykes and Francis J. Carney, Attorney 
Voir Dire and Jury Questionnaire: Time for a Change, Utah Bar Journal, August, 1997, 
http://www.utahbar.org/sites/litigation/Sykes_and_Carney.pdf. The court rej ected plaintiff s 
request. Plaintiff then requested numerous times, to be allowed to submit a voir dire 
questionnaire to the jury to help assist plaintiff in the selection of an unbiased and 
unopinionated jury. When the court denied the submission of a voir dire questionnaire, 
plaintiff submitted a detailed request for voir dire questions to be asked by the court. The 
court decided to do the voir dire himself and to allow the attorneys for the parties to ask 
follow up questions. The questioning of the jury venire by the court was inadequate to allow 
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plaintiff to gauge the attitude of the potential jurors as to tort reform, attitude towards 
attorneys bringing personal injury lawsuits and the awarding of damages. By the time that 
plaintiff was allowed to ask additional questions, the jury venire had been pretty well 
conditioned to not answer questions individually and no meaningful information was obtained 
to allow plaintiff to adequately exercise his for-cause or peremptory challenges. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of voir dire and the Constitutional right 
to it, in Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739 (Utah 2007) and indicated: 
f 69 Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a 
defendant is entitled to question jurors about nthe relevant subject area of 
potential bias." State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 867 (Utah 1998) (citing 
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 
(1991)). Nevertheless, voir dire may be improper even if it satisfies the 
Fourteenth Amendment if it does not ffenable[] litigants and their counsel to 
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges" and is not conducted in such a 
way that, to the extent possible, it ,reliminate[s] bias and prejudice from the 
trial proceedings."1 Id. (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d781,798 (Utah 1991)). 
"Indeed, the fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel to ask voir 
dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and 
subconscious, even though [such attitudes] would not have supported a 
challenge for cause." Id. at 867-68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
f 70 "The scope and conduct of voir dire examination is within the discretion 
of the trial judge." Id. at 867. We have emphasized that "trial courts should be 
permissive in allowing voir dire questions and should exercise their discretion 
in favor of allowing counsel to elicit information from prospective jurors." Id. 
at 868. Nevertheless, "trial judges are not compelled to permit every question 
that... might disclose some basis for counsel to favor or disfavor seating of a 
particular juror." Id. Nor do we think a defendant is entitled to "ask questions 
in a particular manner." Id. at 867 (ff[A]s long as the relevant subject area of 
potential bias was covered, the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated by the 
failure to ask questions in a particular manner." (citing Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 
431,111 S.Ct. 1899)). Thus, when we review a trial court's voir dire decisions 
to determine whether the court abused its discretion we ask ""whether, 
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considering the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate 
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors."1 Id. at 868 
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)). 
Taylor v. State, 156 P.3d 739, 757-758 (Utah 2007). 
Here, the totality of the questioning did not adequately explore the biases and 
prejudices of the potential jury in regard to attitudes about personal injury cases to allow 
plaintiff to intelligently exercise his for-cause and peremptory challenges. 
At least in Bee v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 204 P. 3d 204, 2009 UT App. 35 (Utah App. 
2009) the court, prior to the start of the jury voir dire, reviewed the proposed questions with 
counsel. Here the court did not do that. As in Bee, supra, the court asked broad questions in 
regard to tort reform, but, did not ask individual and probing questions of the members, so that 
any response was more a joint response than a response which would allow plaintiff to ask 
intelligent follow up questions. 
The problem with not being allowed to either conduct voir dire in a way that individual 
meaningful followr up questions can be asked, or not to have answers to a jury questionnaire, 
as was suggested in Alcazar v. University of Utah Hospitals, 188 P.3d 490, 
2008 UT App 222 (Utah App. 2008), footnote 1, is that plaintiffs Seventh Amendment and 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10fs, right to a trial by jury, becomes meaningless. This 
court has repeatedly set forth that voir dire of a jury panel serves two purposes: "1) to allow 
counsel to uncover biases of individual jurors sufficient to support a for-cause challenge and 
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2) to gather information enabling counsel to intelligently use peremptory challenges." Barrett 
v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah App.1993). 
The trial court asked the jury venire closed ended questions and, in the case of Ms. 
Sorensen, tried to rehabilitate her by asking questions that would elicit positive responses. The 
court did exactly what the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have warned about: 
." However, to say the question went far enough in eliciting the information 
Plaintiff was entitled to get "suggests an unwarranted naivety regarding human 
nature. . . . It is unrealistic to expect that any but the most sensitive and 
thoughtful jurors . . . will have the personal insight, candor and openness to 
raise their hands in court and declare themselves biased." State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 
1055, 1058 (Utah 1984). 
Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p.3d 601 at ^ 25. 
As was indicated in Depew, supra, the questioning of the trial court was: 
the all too prevalent practice of avoiding any real inquiry into possible bias by 
a trial judge's asking a prospective juror if he or she could decide the case fairly 
and follow the law given by the judge and then taking a prospective juror's 
affirmative answer as dispositive of the issue of bias. 
Depew, 7 IP. 3d 601 at [^26. 
Ordinarily, an Appellant must show that in the absence of error, a different outcome 
would have resulted. However, as was recognized in Barrett v. Peterson, the Utah Court of 
Appeals indicated: 
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable limitation of voir dire 
substantially impaired his ability to exercise peremptory challenges simply 
cannot prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice resulted from the error. 
Appellant cannot show with any certainty that had certain questions been asked, 
particular responses would have been received; that certain jurors would then 
have been challenged for cause or peremptorily; and that particular, more 
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favorably predisposed jurors would have been seated instead, who would have 
deliberated to a different result. Accordingly, in this context, we apply the test 
enunciated in Hornsby [Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 
P.2d 929, (Utah App.1988)]: Prejudicial error is shown if the appellant's right 
to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been "substantially 
impaired." 758 P.2d at 933. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96, 103 (Utah App. 1993). 
Plaintiff in this case had the right to know what biases and prejudices the prospective 
jurors had so that he could intelligently exercise his for-cause and peremptory challenges. In 
Barrett, supra, the trial court had rejected plaintiffs requested jury voir dire designed to 
discover prospective jurors' exposure to negative reports of medical negligence cases. In the 
case at bar, plaintiff was unable to ascertain the attitude of the jurors on a variety of subjects. 
In Barrett, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court judgment and in doing 
so, said: 
We hold only that in cases such as this one, the plaintiff is entitled during voir 
dire to elicit information from prospective jurors as to whether they have read 
or heard information generally on medical negligence or tort reform, and to 
follow up with appropriate questions if affirmative responses are received. 
The trial court's failure to ask prospective jurors threshold questions sufficient 
to elicit information on the jurors1 possible exposure to tort-reform and medical 
negligence information prevented appellant from detecting possible bias and 
from intelligently exercising his peremptory challenges. The trial court's 
limitation of voir dire questioning substantially impaired appellant's right to the 
informed exercise of his peremptory challenges, and therefore constitutes 
reversible error. The judgment in favor of appellee is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for a new trial. 
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P. 2d 96, 104 (Utah App. 1993). 
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As in Barrett, supra, in the case at bar, the trial court rejected plaintiffs request for 
attorney-conducted voir dire, rejected the use of a juror voir dire questionnaire and did not ask 
most of the requested voir dire questions. The result was that an entire jury was allowed to sit 
in judgment of a personal injury case without plaintiffs having any knowledge of the juror's 
exposure to negative reports of and prejudice against personal injury cases. Plaintiff was 
unable to get a sense of the prospective jurors' attitude towards personal injury cases. The trial 
court's conduct was prejudicial to the plaintiff, because it substantially impaired plaintiffs 
right to meaningful voir dire and his ability to exercise his peremptory challenges in a 
meaningful fashion. The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this 
case for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 
ALLOWED PLAINTIFF'S SETTLEMENT DEMAND LETTER FROM 
A PREVIOUS CIVIL CASE INTO EVIDENCE, WHICH THE 
DEFENDANT THEN USED FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES. 
Plaintiff had been involved in a motor vehicle crash, in January, 2000, approximately 
13 months prior to the crashes which were the subject of this lawsuit. Plaintiff was negotiating 
with the adverse insurance carrier in the 2000 crash. This negotiation carried on after he was 
involved in the subject crash in 2001. In the process of negotiation, plaintiffs counsel sent 
a settlement demand to the adverse insurance carrier, by way of a letter directed to the adverse 
insurance carrier's adjuster. The court allowed defendants in the case at bar to refer to this 
letter and to quote from it extensively, over the objection by plaintiff. R. 1621, 80:4,R. 1622, 
15 
315:3. This letter was then used to impeach plaintiffs witnesses and was allowed to be 
referred to by defendants in the closing argument of their counsel. R. 1623, 544:10, 11. 
As was set forth in Anderson v. Thompson, 176 P.3d 464,2008 UT App 3 (Utah App., 
2008), "Under rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, ,f[e]vidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is . . . not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 408. Anderson, 176 
P.3d 464, [^29. Clearly, the letter in another case, was sent in the process of compromise 
negotiations. Anderson, supra, goes on to indicate: 
Rule 408, however, "does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness...." 
Id. Thus, although generally statements made during settlement negotiations are 
inadmissible under rule 408, there are exceptions, one of which allows for the 
admission of statements made during settlement negotiations if offered for 
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice. 
However, in the case at bar, the use of the letter was not for the showing of bias or 
prejudice of a witness, or other allowable reason. The sole purpose was to prejudice the jury 
against plaintiff because, of a statement in the letter describing his condition. As footnote 3 
in Anderson, supra, says: 
the negotiations must still be relevant. See R. Collin Mangrum Dee Benson, 
Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 183 (2006-07 ed.) (noting that a party 
seeking to admit evidence over a rule 408 objection must show that the 
evidence is relevant). Indeed, under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, any 
relevant evidence, including impeachment evidence under rule 408, "may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the, danger of 
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unfair pit\.:, < Lih R E v Id < 103; see also id R 1 01 (defining "rele v ant 
evide"'^" . 
llcie the negotiation was in a different case, thus not relevant to the case at bar. Even if it is 
assumed that there is relevance, the probative va'wc -T (lie statement is substantially 
outweighed by the danger oi ui iku; pru udice and shoi ilci not have been allowed to be refer red 
to Utah R. Evid. 403 exclusion, the statement introduced, was made by plaintiffs counsel and 
• H by plaintiff ;;M- : here for should noi ki\
 (. been allowed to be referred to as a statement 
made b> piainlill. 
'Imfcrwii I F f iP u l 16 J L > H > I I l l Ili >i Wvi R i l i i I l l U n l l l i r I l u l c l . l l Klilv", ill 1 \ iiiilul u 
and indicates that "in 2006, rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended to state 
that evidence of settlement negotiation- "• •** :.*• -is>iMe ** * ipeach through a prior 
inconsistent statement or contradiction " inderson, supra nt * * ;uui adopts the "rationale 
In; In, 11 in III hi t'liiTeiil I run I itiiiuiii romls IIK'NUIMJC evidence oI sHI lenient negotiations euii lot 
purposes of impe&chmmV" Anderson, supra, at ^ [32. Any evidence related to ike Liter ard n-
contents should have been excluded. The trial court's failure to exclude it, was an abu^c oi 
discretion and unduly prejudicial to piuinwi i warranting a new trial. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
SUBMITTING A CONFUSING SPECIAL JURY VERDICT FORM TO 
THE JURY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recommended that jury instructions are phrased using 
plain English and has formed an advisory committee for that purpose. The charge is simple, 
although the execution seems to have been more difficult. The charge to the advisory 
committees from the Utah Supreme Court is to develop plain language jury instructions that 
juries can easily understand. The Supreme Court's charge is set forth in the minutes of the 
Committee, for example See MINUTES, Advisory Committee on Model Civil Jury 
Instructions, April 15, 2003, http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/muji/ 
archives/2003 -04-15 .pdf. 
In the case at bar, the court gave the jury a special verdict questionnaire which was 
confusing. Plaintiff objected that the terms preponderance and preponderates, are unduly 
confusing to the jury and that plaintiffs proposed special verdict form was more clear and 
should be used. R. 1621 517:14. The court rejected plaintiff s concern. R. 1621,517:21 and 
left the introductory paragraph stand as it was drafted by the court. R. 1621, 522:23 - 523:11. 
A search on Utah courts' website for the term "plain English" brings up a number of 
references, apparently used by the committee. For example, in Peter M. Tiersma, 
Communicating with Juries: How to Draft More Understandable Jury Instructions, he 
indicates: 
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I hus5oneof the most basic principle s :)f comprehensible ji irj iiisti i ictionsisto 
use understandable vocabulary. 
Most legal terms, however, are unknown to the general public. And some — 
like estoppel, lis pendens, per stirpes, tortfeasor, quitclaim, and quash — -arc completely 
mystifying to ordinary speakers of English. In one sense, these words are the 
easiest to deal with. Because they are so obviously technical terms, everyone 
realizes that we should avoid using them in jury instructions. To take another 
example, in most jurisdictions proof by a preponderance of the evidence means 
that it is more likely than not that something is true. So if Jill must prove that 
Jack is her father, it is simpler to say that Jill must prove that it is more likely 
than not that Jack is her father, rather : han Jill must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Jack is her father. In this w ay, the unfamiliar legal term is 
eliminated entirely. 
' I iersma, supra, http: i \ v vv \ v .utcourts.go\ / committees/muji/Communicating w ithjuries.pdf, 
He gives a detailed explanation of the difference between using preponderates and 
preponderance and using plain English. In doing so, he states: 
No doubt some of the previous discussion has seemed a DII abstract, in an effort 
to be more concrete, I'd like to pre* ^ sor^ ^VJV-and-after examples of 
actual jury instn ictions 
I will draw on the new a\ il in*lmu K-US (known as CACI) and compare them 
to the previous instructions {•• *•;.- U\A - . K M I instructions were 
approved h> the California Judicial t « unci! in 200 v I 4 in to give a selection 
of instruct!nn> that might, rnughh >pcaking. be used in an actual negligence 
trial. 
Tiersma, supra, http: w w \\ 1 ltcoi ir ts.goi j committees 11:11 lji 'Communicating v ith 
)juries.pdf> page 22. 
He then sets forth the jury instructions from before the change and after the change. 
Il U ,11 2.hi I 
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Burden of Proof and Preponderance of Evidence 
"Preponderance of the evidence" means evidence that has more convincing 
force than that opposed to it. If the evidence is so evenly balanced that you are 
unable to say that the evidence on either side of an issue preponderates, your 
finding on that issue must be against the party who had the burden of proving 
it. 
You should consider all of the evidence bearing upon every issue regardless of 
who produced it. 
Tiersma, supra, http://www.utcourts.gov/committees/muji/Communicating withjuries.pdf, 
P. 22 
He then says: 
Obviously, explaining who has the burden of proof and the nature of that 
burden is extremely important. But research suggests that jurors often poorly 
understand or confuse standards like preponderance of the evidence and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The definition of the preponderance standard in BAJI 2.60 starts off well 
enough by stating that the evidence must have more convincing force than the 
opposing evidence. But the next sentence is pretty bad, especially the use of the 
verb preponderate. The noun form, preponderance, does occasionally occur in highly 
formal nonlegal contexts. But the verb preponderate is extremely rare. I'm not sure 
that Fve ever heard it in ordinary spoken English. 
CACI200 
Obligation to Prove — More Likely True Than Not True 
A party must persuade you, by the evidence presented in court, that what he or 
she is required to prove is more likely to be true than not true. This is 
sometimes referred to as "the burden of proof." 
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\ 11 CI* VVCi£Ui l i i u a n Kt[ t h e C \ iUCi iL"e, i i jn )u \^<Uii n i J i «. I U C dl i t I : ' '.i t : i»J i i i i:> i i n M v. 
ikely to he true than not true, you must conclude ihat the p^; i\ did not pru\ e 
it. You should consider all the evidence, no matter which pnrtv produced the 
evidence. 
In criminal trials, the prosecution must prove that the defendant is guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. But in civil trials, such as this one, the party who is required 
to prove something need prove only that it is more likely to be true than not 
true. 
He then states the obvious: 
In my \ i e \ \ i • s i - m M n k •: • •. n -. c on s i der ably more understandable than t h e B A JI 
version \\ ^ .no- ihe HL* . ;-cn clearh ; w hether something is more likely than not to 
be true, a phrase that is common in everyday speech. Gone ?£$ preponderate 
sndpreponiJercr < ••' Hie instruction also does something that can be useful for 
jurors: it addresses a possible misconception head-on by distinguishing 'his 
standard from the criminal burden of proof. 
Tiersma, supra, http: '"/ ww w .utcourts.gov/coinmittees/muji/Communicatingwithjuries.pdf, 
P. 22. 
Although we would like to ;m..* that juries u* ..* i ?et confused, as the abn\ c ^ ^ i\ 
ustrates, juries d :> ' u 
forms which are couched m i^mc^c, ihe; arc more iikei) to be confused, ihe trial euurt 
committed error in failing to follow the Utah Supreme Court's guideline regarding plain 
LngliiMr v^ry insuuvoon^ ana ,iU punning, u^ ^peciai >crdict form in plain English 
CONCL USION 
Ihe court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new 
trial, since the trial court committed prejudicial errors in not allowing plaintiff to utilize a 
written jury voir dire questionnaire, HI lading to ask Uie jury v enire appropriate questions 
21 
designed to detect whether any of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform 
propaganda, and to deny plaintiff to conduct his own jury voir dire, to discover prospective 
jurors' exposure to tort reform, negative reports of personal injury cases and their prejudice 
against such cases. The trial court also committed prejudicial error in allowing defendants to 
refer to and discuss a settlement letter which was used in an unrelated case. And, the trial 
court committed prejudicial error in submitting a confusing special verdict form to the jury, 
rather than one that comports with the plain English directive of the Utah Supreme Court. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Ken Claypoole, respectfully requests the Utah Court of 
Appeals to reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. 
DATED AND SUBMITTED thisZ^day of August, 2009. 
ZlL 
David Bert Havas, No. 1424 
DAVID BERT HAVAS, P. C. 




Ill mi Ii nil S d i t n < ' i i i i is l i i l i i i l i i i i i i i : 
Amendment VII 
In suits at common law
 5 where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right 
of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined 
in any court of the I Jnited States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
Ameiiiiliiiiiii'iil \ l V 
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall 
•\. i enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any stale deprive an) person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
proce-- o( law; nor deny to am person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
section 2. Representatives shun t>t apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President 
...;; '* „c President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and 
judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male .: habitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 1 Jnited 
States- or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion., or other crime, the basis 
!
 i eprcsentation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
:: 'er-, shall bearto the whole -^^K—--<*—
 : ; .•jn/cr-'u -nr- one yean ofage in such state. 
section 3, No person shall be a ocimiui or Represenlaiivc mLoiiure^. ot elector of President 
.uni V ice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
: ;ie, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the 
L'nited Slates, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial offu v * of 
an> state. 10 support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection 
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof P. * ^OIKMVSS 
may by a vote of tvvo-*h;*\-^  o r ~v*u fI — v;r ^TIOVC "rich ': .-iH'i'v 
Section 4 1 ne \alidit\ of the public dcbi of the United Slates, authorised b\ ui^ . AILI^^A^ 
.:*. "b incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection 
o? rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the I ;nited States nor any state shall assume 
or pay any debt i ligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim lor the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations 
and claims shall !x- held illegal and void 
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Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Utah Constitution: 
Article I, Section 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall 
consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than 
eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, 
but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil 
cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Utah Code: 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all 
writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory 
appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state 
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the 
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local 
agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction 
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
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(f) appeals from vi*der> on |K.UL1WH;> u.r extraordinary writs sought o\ pu^ons win* m 
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions convtitniino * chaU* *>*><:* 
to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions 
of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited 
^ Choree, annm^K-ni. property division, child custody, si lpport, parent-time, visitation, 
don, and paternity; 
yij appeals from the Utah Miiiiaiv v. omu .mu 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Cour t. 
(3)1 he Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the 
court ma) certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(41 The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
\dministrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings, 
Federal Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise 
(a) Prohibited uses, i A ldcnce of the luli owing is not admissible on behalf of any party, when 
offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was disputed as to 
validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement or contradiction; 
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish-or accepting or offering or promising to 
accept- a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise the claim; and 
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim, except when 
offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency 
in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority. 
(b) Permitted uses,' I his rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for purposes 
not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible purposes include proving a 
witness's bias or prejudice; negating a contention, of undue delav »nd *w\ :ne :*" -ifr- •••< *•. 
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
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Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste 
of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise 
a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability 
for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of 
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a 





IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 




NEIL G, SKOUGARD and BOYD ROSS 
and WINWARD ELECTRIC SERVICE, 
INC., and MICHAEL WOOD, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Civil No. 040700622 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions. 
1. Based on all of the evidence in this case, was defendant, Winward 
Electric Service, Inc./Wood, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
2. If you found defendant, Winward Electric Service, Inc.A/Vood, to be 
negligent, was that negligence a cause of Ken Ciaypoole's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
3. Based on all of the evidence in this case, was defendant, Neil G, 
Skougard/Ross, negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
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4. If you found defendant, Neil G, Skougard/Ross, to be negligent, was that 
negligence a cause of Ken Claypoole's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
5. If you have answered either or both of Questions 2 and 4 "Yes," then 
answer the following question: Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to 
total 100%, what percentage of that negligence is attributable to: 
A. Defendant, Winward Electric Service, Inc./Wood, % 
B. Defendant, Neil G, Skougard/Ross, % 
TOTAL 100% 
6. If you have answered either or both of Questions 2 and 4 "Yes," state the 
amount of economic and non-economic damages, if any, sustained by Ken Claypoole 
as a result of his injuries. If neither question was answered "Yes," do not answer this 
question. 
Economic Damages: 
Past Medical Expenses $ 
Past earnings, Including Benefits $ 
Future earnings, Including Benefits $ 
Past Household Services Losses $ 
Future Household Services Losses $ 
Future Medical Expenses $ 
TOTAL ECONOMIC DAMAGES $ 
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Non-Economic Damages: 
Nature and extent of injuries $ 
Pain and suffering (mental and physical) $ 
Loss of pursuit of ordinary affairs $ 
Disfigurement $ 
Loss of enjoyment of life $ 
TOTAL NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES $ 
TOTAL DAMAGES | 




MUJI FORM 36.2 NEGLIGENCE - COMPARATIVE FAULT SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM - MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS 
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I hereby certify that on the -2 t^iay of August, 2009, a copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
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Attorneys for Defendants Michael Wood and Overnight 
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